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Abstract
This paper aims to address possible psychoanalytical explanations for the heinous
acts in which terrorists, particularly ISIS, engage. It focuses on Harold D. Lasswell’s
principles of the id, ego, and superego as well as Tajfel and Turner’s social identity
theory. Within the framework of these two theories, relevant psychological and social
psychological theories are discussed in order to explore a possible connection between
the psyche of violent perpetrators and their actions. By exploring these connections, I
find that there may be more nuanced psychological explanations for these violent acts,
which could lead to new methods of weakening perceived biases, intergroup conflicts,
and extremist behavior.
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Introduction
Many see terrorism in an instant: the explosion of a bomb, an airplane hijacking, or
a bus ramming. These events dominate the news cycle and characterize groups like AlQaeda, ISIS, and Boko Haram as dangerous extremists. Media play directly into the
terrorist’s scheme in depicting them as brutish, radical, and willing to go to extremes to
further a cause. However, many fail to look beyond the immediate release of decapitation
videos or the headline of over 200 school girls being kidnapped. The puzzle behind these
events is not the mechanics; how extremist groups physically carry out terror is obvious.
The puzzle lies in how an individual is able to execute such horrendous acts, since it runs
counter to what most understand to be ethical human behavior.
Killing others violates, except in self-defense, contemporary social conventions
about right and wrong. It is right to help a neighbor in need; it is wrong to kill another
human being. How can an ethical human inflict such brute violence onto another human
being?
These rights and wrongs stem back to the Ten Commandments during the Late
Antique era and other ancient ethical standards of other cultures. However, contrary to the
commandment “Thou shall not kill”, tolerance for killing other human beings was
commonplace until recently. Throughout time, empires ravaged territories in conquests,
public executions were accepted, and religious warfare was justified. Common to these
instances of murder is that each were justified by a purpose; each victim was deserving in
the eyes of the perpetrator – the objective of an empire was to expand, one was publicly
executed because one was guilty of violating societal norms, and religious bloodshed was
justified by God. The moral code that opposes the killing of others outside of state vs. state
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wars continuously arose since the Enlightenment. Demonstratively, the reactions to the
appalling Nazi actions reinforced this code. Though Hitler and the Nazi party presented a
justification and mission for the systematic murder of Jews and others, the international
community deemed these actions wrong and unjust.
Perpetrators of terrorism undermine their own cause by engaging in such violent
acts that create stereotypes of the social, religious, or political group. Today, there are not
only immediate consequences of destruction during a terrorist attack, but broader social,
economic, and political ramifications associated with such acts. It is extraordinarily strange
behavior for someone to engage in, since it causes harm to ingroup members. The most
prevalent example of this is the rise of Islamophobia. The extremists of such groups that
claim to be of Islamic faith are responsible for hardships the broader Muslim community
is facing. They have created an environment in which the followers of the Islamic faith are
vilified in the Western world. Thus, although the extremists represent a minority of
Muslims, their actions negatively affect the majority.
This presents the paradox: why would Islamic extremists perform acts of terror if
many others believe that it so negatively affects the broader Muslim community? Though
anti-Muslim sentiment was prevalent before 9/11, instances of anti-Muslim hate crimes,
discrimination, fear, and racial profiling have since skyrocketed. In 2016, an Imam and his
assistant were gunned down in front of their mosque (Melendez, Pilar, and Ray Sanchez).
A 60-year-old Muslim woman was fatally stabbed on her walk home (CBS New York). A
2015 survey reported that 55 percent of Muslim children experienced some type of bullying
in school due to their faith (Islamic Networks Group). A Muslim congressman has received
death threats (CNN Video).
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This thesis will examine multiple theories that address human violence and
intergroup conflict in the context of extremist Islam. Determining a relationship, then,
among the theories may be useful in formulating counter strategies. The foundational
theories will be Lasswell’s take on Freud’s tri-part division of personality – the id, ego,
and superego – as well as Tajfel’s social identity theory. Illuminating a possible
correspondence between these two may help to provide an explanation as to why and
how the consciences of extremists allow them to engage in heinous acts.
No single theory can account for all terrorist acts. Thus, counter strategies may
differ on a case-by-case basis. However, it will be useful to create a framework for
analyzing the dynamics behind an act of terror to more easily determine an appropriate
response, as well as prevent future violence.
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Theories
To develop methods of lessening intergroup conflict, resentment and stereotyping,
it is first important to review the relevant psychological theories that pertain to violent and
possibly morally abnormal behavior. Insofar as these theories hold, their claims may prove
pertinent when considering the psychological processes that may, at least partially, account
for the seemingly outlandish and heinous acts of extremists. If their actions can be partially
attributed to psychological reasoning, then the understanding of that reason may provide
opportunity to combat the processes and deter such conflict.

Triple-Appeal Principle
The triple-appeal principle is a psychological model, based on the Freudian
divisions of personality: id, ego, and superego to explain different psychological reactions
to appeals espoused from varied deliberate persuasive efforts. Lasswell (1932, 523) states,
“the id may be said to correspond with impulses, the superego with conscience, and the
ego with reason”. An appeal can be issued from three sources: a person, institution, or
occasion. Entities may attempt to appeal to their audience’s id, ego, superego, or some
combination. The division or divisions in which the target of appeal is, may be a deliberate
choice.1

1

For example, if a mother praises her child for making his or her bed in the morning with

a hug, then the child will feel emotionally good about making the bed. This is an appeal
to the id. If the mother gives the child five dollars for making the bed, then the child will
be motivated to repeat the act because of the money; this appeals to the ego. It could be
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Lasswell (1932, 533) categorizes institutional appeals in this way: “The appeal to
expediency [ego] is predominant in economic, political, scientific, and technological
institutions; the appeal to conscious [superego] is that of religion and fundamental law; the
appeal to natural impulse [id] is that of art and sociability [brackets inserted]”.
Nevertheless, this is not a definitive categorization, since institutions, like political ones,
may also appeal to the id or superego. 2 A person, institution, or occasion may be able to
simultaneously appeal to the id, ego, and superego. Hence, individuals may deliberately
appeal to one division, or multiple, if they think that it will advance a specific objective.
The appeal of an occasion, however, is most important to analyzing violent acts.
An act is an occasion – the chopping off of a head, the flying of planes into towers, or
bombing a subway, are all acts meant to evoke emotion; to appeal to the id. Violent acts
are meant to arouse fear and anger from the outgroup.

assumed that a mother would want her child to make his or her bed because that is the
responsible thing to do and feel good about it, rather than for mere monetary gain. Thus,
the appeal to the superego is more effective to achieve the goal of increasing
responsibility. If the goal was just for the task to be done, then the appeal to the ego may
be more effective.
2

For example, military recruitment videos of strong individuals climbing ropes, driving

tanks, and protecting their families is appealing to one’s id – emotion; while the patriotic
call for duty appeals to the superego – conscious – as a moral act. Thus, a combination of
appeals is used from the government, which is clearly a political institution.
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According to Lasswell (1932, 531), these acts may occur because accepted social
norms and adherence to moral codes has repressed raw impulses of the id (aroused by the
original occasion); however, the destructive urge of the id does not fade away. Rather, the
impulse may be directed upon substitute targets. Hence, “whenever there is a striking lack
of proportion between an act and the reasons alleged for it, there is a presumption that some
unconscious impulses are involved in the acts” (Lasswell 1932, 526). Likewise, Leon
Festinger (1962, 98) touches on the instance of repressed raw impulses in his theory of
cognitive dissonance:
Imagine the psychological situation that exists for an individual who is tempted to
engage in a certain action but for some reason or another refrains… All the
pressures, reasons and justifications for refraining are consonant with his actual
behavior. Nevertheless, the dissonance [which is equivalent to the id in this context]
does exist, and there will be psychological activity oriented toward reducing this
dissonance.
A breach of societal norms or a threat to the group with which one identifies,
stimulates the repressed id. This leads to an increased chance of one acting on raw impulses
without reason of the ego or inhibition of the superego. There is a “crisis of conscious”
between raw impulse and social inhibition when one’s environment equilibrium feels
threatened, and often, the discomfort fostered by this tension leads to an overpowering of
the id (Lasswell 1932, 537).
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Vicarious Retribution
This part of Lasswell’s analysis can be directly related to Lickel et al.’s theory of
vicarious retribution. Lickel et al. provide a framework for understanding how blame is
ascribed to the outgroup; once an act occurs that has been personally offensive or has
offended a fellow ingroup member, then the attribution of traits of the perpetrator is
generalized to the entire outgroup, since the original perpetrator may be unavailable or the
outgroup is perceived to be coherent and alike (Lickel et al. 2006, 312). Existence of
generalized blame is not new or uncommon. 3 Thus, even though the outgroup target may
not be directly responsible for acts in which the ingroup perpetrator is avenging, the
outgroup individual is held accountable. However, social inhibitions regarding what is
morally acceptable prevent rampant intergroup violence from occurring; yet, there are
instances when the inhibited id acts out – this is when a violent act may materialize.
Individuals first attempt to make sense of the act that was offensive to themselves or their
group, and then rationalize who is to blame. In this model, the blame lands on any one
individual of the outgroup with whom the original perpetrator is identified.

3

For example, loyal Republicans in the deep South of the United States often vicariously

attribute extreme leftist traits to all those who identify as Democrats, regardless of the
degree to which the individuals beliefs are leftist. Likewise, a Democrat from the reliably
blue Pacific Northwest may assume extreme rightist Republican traits of anyone from the
South. However, just because Democrats and Republicans may hold these perceptions of
the other, does not commonly mean that they are going to inflict acts of violence upon
one another.
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Group identification and perceived outgroup entitativity4 are the main factors that
influence the possibility of vicarious retribution. Group identification plays a role in the
likelihood of vicarious retribution; the stronger an individual identifies with a group, the
higher likelihood one is to act on behalf of the given group. Lickel et al. (2006, 377) claim
that “identification increases a sense of anger and influences the motivation for vicarious
retribution because of its links to group pride and empathy for harmed ingroup members”
[italics in the original]. Thus, these are the two factors that influence an individual’s
strength of identification; however, social norms are a third way that may also promote a
heightened sense of identification, since they “not only define what is morally appropriate;
but may also represent an expected standard of behavior” (Lickel et al. 2006, 377).
Group identification is one basis for such acts, while perceived group entitativity
explains the target – “why people would be motivated to take revenge against someone
other than the perpetrator” (Lickel et al. 2006, 378). The retribution is spread across
outgroup members for two main reasons: unavailability of original perpetrator and
perceived united, coherent outgroup, which leads to the perception that “blameworthy
qualities are shared” among the entire outgroup.
The step Lickel et al. are missing is from attributing generalized traits of the
outgroup to violent episodes; it is to account for the id, ego, or superego that Lasswell
discusses. Lasswell’s analysis of the division of personality may help to fill this gap. Once

4

“Entitativity (Campbell, 1958) is the perception that a group is a unified and coherent

whole in which the members are perceived to be bonded together in some way” (Lickel et
al. 2006, 378).
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the attributes are generalized to a group, the repressed raw impulse is stimulated and there
is opportunity for violence to occur. The initial act, like the historical fall of the caliphate,
provides this opportunity to trigger raw impulse.
Lickel et al. do not give attention to “affective” – acting out of raw impulse – vs.
“instrumental” aggression – acting due to a sense of justification. However, the former may
be associated with the id – acting out of emotion and raw impulse – while the latter may
stem from the ego, superego, or both. One shortcoming of Lickel et al.’s framework, then,
may be that they do not dedicate much attention to the instrumental reasons. Instead, they
state that “we are interested in charting the cognitive and motivational processes that give
rise to support for retaliation against the outgroup” (Lickel et al. 2006, 375). Hence, they
neglect the possibility of the role instrumental reasons (i.e. the ego and superego) may play
when interacting with the id. Instead, they focus on affective reasons that explain the id
fueling affective aggression. However, there may be a connection between instrumental
aggression and the other two divisions of personality, the ego and superego, which Lickel
et al. do not explore.
Nevertheless, aggression is often a combination of all three divisions, rather than
either being solely affective or instrumental. For example, the attack on an ingroup member
may arouse raw impulses to retaliate, but social inhibitions typically prohibit one from
acting upon those impulses. However, instrumental aggression becomes relevant when the
offended ingroup members can provide a justification for the raw impulses they are feeling.
Thus, not only will they act on an impulse, but will also believe that the impulse is justified
due to institutional appeals to the ego and superego. Appeals are frequently most powerful
when they dovetail with one another in this way.
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Displacement Hypothesis
Harold D. Lasswell developed the psychological hypothesis of displacement,
arguably his “most direct and prominent application of psychoanalytic theory” (Ascher
2005, 22). It dictates that an individual may displace his or her discomfort onto a more
remote object, even if the source of the discomfort is in reachable proximity. Ascher (2005,
22) further specifies that “In some instances, these displacements may occur without
conscious awareness of the connection between the original and the resulting impulses or
affects”. Thus, the rationalization for these impulses may only be identifiable by a third
party, rather than individual self-awareness. The unconscious unawareness is where
Lasswell incorporates the Freudian theory of the id, ego, and superego. Accordingly, “the
displacement hypothesis invokes Freudian dynamics by positing that certain thoughts or
emotions are so painful, threatening, or overwhelming that the individual will repress them,
and redirect them onto more remote or otherwise less potent objects” (Ascher 2005, 22).
Hence, the superego then rationalizes the displaced behavior.
Lasswell formulated this theory in the terms p } d } r = p where “private motives
(p) are displaced (d) onto public objects, and then rationalized (r) in terms of the public
interest” (Lasswell 1930/1960, 75). Thus, the private motives are equivalent to id impulses
and the rationalization is a result of the superego. Further, this rationalization is in
accordance with the individual’s belief system (Ascher 2005, 23).
Displacement occurs if individuals feels as though they cannot act out against the
source because of their proximity to the source. For example, if one resents his or her father,
the individual may not feel as though he or she can retaliate against the father due to the
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personal connection. According to the displacement hypothesis, this individual may instead
resent all other men matching the characteristics of his or her father.
Resenting remote objects leads to stereotyping. Since one has a father that is resent
worthy, then all father figures are worthy of resentment, regardless of the actual
characteristics of the remote fatherly men. No individual can be certain of the
characteristics or beliefs another stranger holds, however, the simplification of attributes
ascribed to a group of others is how stereotypes perpetuate and perceived entitativity
strengthens.
Stereotypes are dialectic; the same presumed attribute may be positive or negative
based on the circumstance. For example, consider a generalization that Armenians are
clever. When an Armenian is in an academic setting, a superior may assume that the
individual is smart and insightful due to his or her cleverness. Contrarily, a peer holding
this stereotype may be reluctant to share work with the Armenian because he or she may
think that the individual will use cleverness to take advantage of the work. Thus, the impact
of an attributed stereotype wholly depends on the context in which it is being applied.
Similar to displacing one’s resentment of a proximate object, one may displace his
or her own negative self-assessment onto remote objects; justifying his or her own
insecurities in finding the wrongs of others beliefs or customs. Lasswell illustrates this
element of the displacement hypothesis that is accounting “for attitudes toward public
objects that originate in attitudes toward other public objects [italics in original] (Ascher
2005, 25), in his view of anti-Semitism by the Germans:
Plainly the Jew was available as the symbol which more than any other could be
utilized as a target of irrelevant emotional drives. The hatred of the country for the
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city, of aristocracy for the plutocracy, of the middle class for the manual toilers and
the aristocracy for the plutocracy could be displaced upon the Jews (Lasswell
1936b/1958, 45).
German society felt shame for straying from tradition and it’s arising progressive culture.
However, the Jews were exacerbating this avant-garde behavior. Thus, the Jewish
community was used as a scapegoat to justify the Germans own insecurities surrounding
their evolving societal tendencies.
Another example of displaced negative self-assessment, more relevant to this
thesis, surrounds a pious Muslim man experiencing inner urges to sleep with an unveiled
woman. Though the man desires to act upon his id desire, he is inhibited by the superego
that is his religious beliefs. Ascher supports, “perhaps the original impulses are
unacceptable in light of the individual’s need to be upstanding and worthy of self-respect
and the respect of others [in his religious community]” (2005, 26). Since he cannot piously
indulge with the unveiled woman, perhaps, in his mind, no man should. Thus, any man
who does sleep with unveiled women, regardless of his or her beliefs, is stereotyped by this
man as piously inferior; since, the Muslim man is resisting his urges, then other men must
not be, and therefore are worthy of resentment, punishment, and inferiority.
In this scenario, there are two elements of the id. First is an aggressive urge to sleep
with the unveiled woman. Second is the moral indignation described above, but this is
satisfied by resenting the man who does indulge; the superego reaction to the id of the
Muslim man leads to moral indignation against those who do indulge for being
‘wrongdoers’. However, the aggression impulse of the id is not satisfied, and this is where
violence may emerge if superego social inhibitions are overpowered.
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Cognitive Dissonance
Leon Festinger’s (1962, 94) theory of cognitive dissonance is founded on the terms
dissonance – feelings of discomfort when one’s existing expectations are disrupted or not
met – and consonance – when there is no discomfort in an individual's psychological state.
Festinger (1962, 93) states that “this theory centers around the idea that if a person knows
various things that are not psychologically consistent with one another, he will, in a variety
of ways, try to make them more consistent”. Thus, individuals will often try to make sense
of, and come to terms with, behaviors, feelings, or opinions that are not originally
consistent with their own.
In human behavior, individuals seek consistency and positive levels of self-esteem.
Hence, their attitudes, beliefs, opinions, and codes tend to be consistent with themselves
and their identities (Festinger, 1957, 1). Thus, humans will engage in actions that they
believe will reduce feelings of dissonance or inconsistency. To discuss instances of
cognitive dissonance and ways to dispel that dissonance, Festinger focuses on three
different types of situations: decision making, lying, and temptation. For the purpose of
this thesis, his analysis on decision making is most relevant.
A decision to act out violently may be based on the rejection of beliefs that violence,
in the given context, is immoral, or that the intended victim is not culpable. When cognitive
dissonance takes place, the impulse fueling the violence is supported by the belief that it is
socially acceptable. Typically, violence is not socially accepted, and therefore destructive
id impulses are inhibited, as Lasswell addresses in discussing social inhibitions. However,
Festinger says the typical social denouncement of violence that is inhibitory of acting upon
raw impulse may be rejected. Instead, rigidified belief structures may reinforce the
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rejection of the social norm, like the establishment of a caliphate, or a “just war”. Thus,
“changes in terms of information that produce or restore consistency are referred to as
dissonance-reducing changes” (1962, 93).
According to Festinger, there are two ways to dispel dissonance. First, to “persuade
himself that the attractive features of the rejected alternative [the non-violent option] are
not really so attractive” (Festinger 1962). Perpetrators may rationalize their decision to be
violent by persuading themselves that violence is a more attractive course of action for x,
y, and z reasons than doing nothing but sit on the repressed dissonance and id impulses.
Second, is to exaggerate the attractive features of the decision made (the possibly violent
option), thus further justifying an action or decision, and convincing oneself that it will
restore consonance. Finally, dissonance can only be reduced after a decision is made and
the outcome is clear. Then, the restoration of consonance and justification for a decision
can begin.
There may be instances where dissonance is not easily dispelled, and thus the drive
to restore consonance is repressed. This is comparable to Lasswell’s repressed raw
impulses of the id. The dissonance is repressed by the pressure of consonance, like the id
may be repressed by social inhibitions. Eventually, raw impulses and feelings of
dissonance may no longer be tolerable, resulting in acts driven by id and feelings of
dissonance. The theory is that the greater the level of dissonance, which builds the longer
it is repressed, the greater the urge to reduce it becomes.
The perpetuation of intergroup violence through the rejection of anti-violence
appeals, or evidence of innocence, is fueled by the continuous efforts to maintain
consonance. Festinger confirms this by claiming that “what would produce dissonance for
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one person might produce consonance for another” (1962, 94). Likewise, groups may not
share norms or interpretations of reality, which also supports the perpetuation of violence
between two groups.
Another, often more dramatic, way of reducing dissonance is for one to completely
alter one’s opinions and beliefs to create consonance – change the viewpoint that was
dissonant. This may be more directly applied to the process of recruitment to a group when
individuals do not see their views aligning with the expectation of their current social
surroundings. Hence, they may search for a group in which their dissonance is considered
consonant. A group may try to recruit by appealing to feelings of repressed id and
dissonance (Festinger 1957, 177).5 Thus, groups like ISIS appeal to these dissonances and
attempt to illustrate its own community as an outlet for the discomfort created in the
outgroup.
Lastly, Festinger also believes that every case of dissonance and its reduction must
be analyzed on a case-by-case basis. He states,
There are, certainly, individual differences among people in the degree to which…
they react to… dissonance. For some people dissonance is an extremely painful

5

For example, there may be dissonance in an individual’s original state of expectations

between what they believe they are entitled to and what they are actually receiving.
Those individuals may feel entitled to a job but are experiencing unemployment; may
believe in equal wages but are being paid less than an equal peer; may wish to practice a
certain religion but are facing religious discrimination.

Flynn 16

and intolerable thing, while there are others who seem to be able to tolerate a larger
amount of dissonance (Festinger 1957, 266-267).
However, the question then arises whether perpetrators of violent acts are less tolerant to
dissonance than the majority, or are their levels of dissonance greater, or is it a combination
of both. To answer this question, an analysis is necessary of to what extent the belief system
that is justifying the impulse is elaborated and established.
Nevertheless, either of these dynamics can hold. On one hand, as has been
discussed, a perpetrator may be less tolerant to dissonance and this may lead him or her to
act out violently, thus rejecting the accepted social norms that inhibit such act. On the other
hand, perpetrators may not experience dissonance at all. However, further psychoanalysis
of primary accounts would be needed to make a distinction; it also likely varies on a caseto-case basis.

Social Identity Theory
Tajfel’s social identity theory has three components: categorization, identification,
and comparison. First, social categorization entails individuals placing others into groups.
Second, individuals categorize themselves as a member of one, or multiple, of those
groups that they perceive will maintain or improve their self-esteem. Finally, individuals
engage in social comparison, by comparing their identified group with other categories.
The criteria to be an ingroup member is that the individual identifies himself with
the group, and the group members acknowledge the individual as part of the ingroup.
According to Tajfel, a group is a collection of people who perceive themselves in a
similar way. Members may share like feelings of “emotional involvement” in the identity
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and share similar beliefs in social structure. These are not necessary for a group to form,
however they may be relevant to the type of groups in question in this thesis. Further,
social categorization is a “cognitive tool that segment [s], classify, and order the social
environment”; thus, this is the process by which one identifies with a group. (Tajfel and
Turner 1986, 15). De-categorization, then, is the undoing or shifting of selfcategorization or identification from one group, possibly to another.
Another important element of Tajfel and Turner’s social identity theory is that not
only is it vital that individuals self-categorize, they then must place their group in a
scheme compared to other groups. Individuals cannot compare their group with every
outgroup, so there must be certain ones to which they refer. (Tajfel and Turner 1986, 16)
Perhaps, this is similar to the hypothesis of vicarious retribution on an intergroup level
rather than interpersonal.
There are, however, a couple caveats to this theory. The researchers frame their
theory by exploring why antagonism is targeted against an other. Thus, they look to the
ingroup to explore the intergroup conflict but do not delve much into inner group
relations. They conclude that intergroup conflict occurs because an ingroup individual
negatively perceives an outgroup for a reason based on a comparison being made to that
other categorization. Second, Tajfel and Turner focus on a single individual identity and
are not complicated by identifying with multiple groups.
In contrast, Lasswell understands that individuals have multiple identities. For
example, a woman living in the United States whose parents emigrated from India may
be a member of at least three separate identities: American, female, and Indian. This
example is greatly simplified as individuals encompass numerous identities including
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sports teams, schools attended, video game passions, volunteer activities, and other
hobbies or elements that comprise a person. Essentially, these various identities are the
building blocks of who individuals are and how they conduct their lives.
However, different identities within a person become more salient given different
situations (Turner et al. 1987). For example, when a teenage boy who plays varsity
basketball and is the lead actor in the school play is on the court, his identity as a
basketball player is greatly heightened over his identity as an actor. The opposite occurs
when he is on stage. ISIS fighters may have many different identities as well. They could
identify with their gender, Islam, region, and other parts of their upbringing. “Promoter of
violent jihad” is only one of their many identities.
The more groups with which individuals identify, the more complex is their
whole identity. Since single identities are salient in different scenarios, every identity of
an individual may be categorized as salient at a certain point in time. Identity complexity
is important because interpersonal conflict may be more easily and effectively lessened if
their identities are complex, or able to be further complicated, which will be addressed
later.

Relative Deprivation
Faye Crosby uses the working theories of Davis (1959), Gurr (1970), and Runciman
(1996) to create a comprehensive model of relative-deprivation. Relative-deprivation
theory “refers to the proposition that one’s sense of grievance is not a monotonic function
of one’s actual situation in an absolute sense” (Crosby 1976, 88) because individuals
compare their situations to one another, rather than evaluating it without reference subjects.

Flynn 19

The concept, however, “is used to refer to the emotion one feels when making negatively
discrepant comparisons...the emotion of relative deprivation is one type of anger [italics in
original]” (Crosby 1976, 88); anger is a raw impulse and, hence, an action of the id. Thus,
at the root of the theory is an acting out of the Freudian, id. Nevertheless, it is important to
note that relative-deprivation can, but does not always, lead to violence; it can lead to no
acts, moderate acts, and extreme acts. Lastly, in defining the theory, it is important to
understand that deprivation is not absolute, but relative; one must have a subjective
reference point to be comparing oneself to feel relatively deprived (Crosby 1976, 85).
Thus, the more exposure one has to “others” and the world, – through education, media,
and travel, for example – the greater the likelihood for these feelings to arise, since the
exposed individual has more experiences to which to compare.
Rather than casting her model as one possible causal chain of relative-deprivation,
Crosby sees it as an evolutionary law in the theory of relative-deprivation. She claims to
have created a comprehensive model of relative-deprivation that is built upon the previous
work regarding the topic (Crosby 1976, 87). According to this model (1976, 90), in order
for action based on relative-deprivation anger to occur, five preconditions must be met:
“1 see that someone else (Other) [parenthesis in original] posses X,
2 want X,
3 feel entitled to X,
4 think it feasible to obtain X, and
5 lack a sense of personal responsibility for not having X”
These are the preconditions for someone to take the step of feeling relatively deprived, to
acting upon those feelings. Without the presence of precondition four, an individual is
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unlikely to act on this anger; individuals may only act if they feel that change is feasible
and a difference can be made through personal actions. She says that a person will stop
having feelings of relative-deprivation when X is no longer attainable (when pre-condition
4 is not met), but will to continue to want X if it is feasible (Crosby 1976, 91). Thus, if one
can diminish the feeling that there is an opportunity for change or make X unfeasible, then
violent acts may be better avoided.
Further pertinent to this study is that “X does not necessarily represent a concrete
object. It can also refer to an action; simply translate the phrase possession of X into
capacity to perform X [italics in original]” (Crosby 1976, 90). When using the model to
analyze violent acts, it is more likely to refer to the capacity to perform.
Once the preconditions have been met, the likelihood of whether the anger will be
translated into violence or constructive actions depends on mediating variables: whether
one is intropunitive or extrapunitive, one’s level of personal control, and one’s real
opportunities for effecting change. Individuals who have extropunitive tendencies take
their anger of being relative deprived out in violent acts toward society. There are two paths
an extropunitive may follow to reach this act. First, if the preconditions are met, then
feelings of relative-deprivation are onset. Next, if the extrapunitive tends to have low
personal control, then an act of violence towards society is likely. The second path follows:
if the preconditions are met, feelings of relative-deprivation begin, and if one tends to be
extropunitive but has high personal control, constructive opportunities for change must be
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blocked in order for an act of violence against society to occur. 6 (Crosby 1976, 100) Thus,
blocked constructive opportunities represses the anger (the id), and instead leads to
violence as the outlet.
There are a few connections between this model of relative-deprivation and
Festinger’s one of cognitive dissonance, like the connection between personal control and
tolerance. If one has less personal control, one may have a lower tolerance for dissonance.
The combination of these characteristics increases the probability of a violent act. Too,
according to Crosby (1976, 85), “People are, in fact, concerned with justice and fairness
and do feel dissatisfied when their own internal codes are violated”, which speaks to
Festinger’s notions that when one’s expectations are met, consonance is present, but when
they are not, and violated as Crosby alludes to above, then dissonance occurs. Hence,
injustice and inequality, from which feelings of relative-deprivation anger arise, create
dissonance.
Gurr’s “value expectations” also align with Festinger. Value expectations are
“those goods and opportunities that the individual wants and to which he feels entitled,
based on comparisons with similar others” (Crosby 1976, 88). Thus, when individuals feel
they are experiencing everything to which they are entitled, then the environment is

6

1.) Preconditions are met → Starts to feel relatively deprived → Extropunitive

tendencies → Low personal control → Violence against society occurs. 2.) Preconditions
are met → Starts to feel relatively deprived → Extropunitive tendencies → High personal
control → Opportunities for expression/outlets are blocked → Violence against society
occurs.
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consonant. These expectations occur from comparing oneself to others. “Person wants what
similar others possess” (Crosby 1976, 95), so if similar others all possess the same
expectations and are surrounded by those similar to himself or herself, then there is no
opportunity for relative-deprivation or dissonance to emerge.
Ian Walker and Thomas F. Pettigrew (1984) provide a critique of Crosby’s (1976)
model of egoistical relative deprivation, which “occurs when an individual compares
himself to others” (Crosby 1976, 88). Walker and Pettigrew first show the interdependence
between relative-deprivation and Tajfel’s social identity theory.
The third component of social identity theory, social comparison, is where Crosby
and Tajfel most overlap. Walker and Pettigrew state that “the positive and negative aspects
of membership in one particular group are contingent on that group’s standing relative to
other reference groups. To determine their social identity, people generally compare their
own membership group to some other reference group(s) along important evaluative
dimensions [parentheses in original]” (Walker and Pettigrew, 1984, 302). Thus, one group
uses another group as a reference point, which relates to Crosby’s work in claiming that
deprivation is relative, not absolute. Further Walker and Pettigrew clearly outline the
relationship between social identity theory and relative-deprivation theory by stating,
In CIC [Categorization-Identity-Comparison, which is equivalent to social identity
theory here] theory individuals evaluate their social identifications and social
identities by comparing the membership group with some referent other. If the
evaluation proves to be negative, the individual experiences relative deprivation
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and is motivated to one of several possible behaviors 7, ranging from changing
membership8 in the negatively evaluated group to changing the dimensions of
comparison (Walker and Pettigrew 1984, 302).
Though Walker and Pettigrew establish the connection between social identity
theory and relative-deprivation, they critique Crosby’s aged model and advocate for
adjustment to better fit social identity theory with relative-deprivation. The relevance and
importance of Crosby’s model of relative deprivation is acknowledged when they state that
“she turns earlier theorists on their heads by viewing relative-deprivation as an intervening
variable rather than a hypothetical construct” (Walker and Pettigrew, 1984, 304). However,
Walker and Pettigrew surface three major criticisms: first, that she is too focused on
egoistical relative deprivation and does not devote enough attention to fraternalistic
deprivation. Second, the tree-diagram models used to demonstrate the various paths of
relatively deprived feelings are difficult to test. Lastly, her “behavioral dependent
variables”, the two potential outcomes – “constructive change of society” and “violence
against society” – that are triggered by feelings of relative deprivation, are criticized
(Walker and Pettigrew, 1984, 304). Walker and Pettigrew argue that “violence against
society” is often a planned and reasoned action. Likewise, “constructive change of society”
can be just as destructive and violent – sometimes more so – toward society, like during a
“rally or a riot” (Walker and Pettigrew, 1984, 304). Further, they claim that there is no

7

Previously outlined in footnote 6.

8

Like leaving a society to a community appealing to one’s feelings of dissonance.
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differentiation between violence motivated by a drive for social change and a drive to
obtain social control.
Additional to critiquing Crosby’s specific model, Walker and Pettigrew provide
conceptual deficiencies to the theory of relative deprivation. First, they argue that too much
focus has been on egoistical deprivation, like by Gurr and Crosby, and not enough
theorizing has been attributed to fraternalistic deprivation. Runciman is the only one that
differentiates between egoistic deprivation and fraternal deprivation, which is when one
“compares his own reference group to other reference groups” (Crosby 1976, 88).
Crosby’s comprehensive model is applicable to both types; however, Runciman’s fraternal
deprivation may be more relevant to the discussion of intergroup conflict, especially in
cases of vicarious retribution. Walker and Pettigrew argue that fraternal deprivation most
supports social identity theory because,
when Tajfel (1982) maintains that positive social identity, reinterpretation of group
attributes and social action are meaningful only in comparison with other groups,
the empirical tests of these claims must necessarily involve fraternal – not egoistic
– comparisons [parentheses and italics in original] (Walker and Pettigrew, 1984,
305).
Thus, while the work on egoistical deprivation is fundamentally necessary, relative
deprivation theorization ought to shift towards fraternalistic deprivation.
Walker and Pettigrew also argue that only cognitive components have been taken
into account; however, affective components deserve equal attention. They believe that
“important insights could be gained by emphasizing a distinction between cognitive and
affective components within the unitary concept of RD [relative-deprivation]” (Walker and

Flynn 25

Pettigrew, 1984, 307). Further, to relate to Lickel et al., the element of id impulses, which
is affective, ought to be taken into account more seriously.
Additionally, there is a problem in “predicting the referent people will use for
comparison [italics in original]” (Walker and Pettigrew 1984, 308). Some work on the
“referent selection process” has formed, but there ought to be further development in
theorizing how an individual or ingroup chooses to whom they refer themselves (Walker
and Pettigrew 1984, 308-309). Thus, once it is determined why one group is selected as the
referent, the elements that are being compared of that referent group must also be
examined.

Defense Mechanism Theory
Though the theory of defense mechanisms has been highly contested in the past,
there is now significant evidence to show the existence of such mechanisms. Some
psychologists have argued that there was no way to demonstrate what happens in one’s
unconscious, simply because it is unconscious. However, Phebe Cramer disputes this
argument by providing the “Seven Pillars of Defense Mechanism Theory,” which argues
that humans employ a variety of defense mechanisms in their unconscious.
Defense mechanisms “protect the individual from experiencing excessive anxiety,
and to protect the self and self-esteem” (Cramer 2009, 1). To pose the existence of defense
mechanisms, Cramer focuses on three: denial, projection, and identification. The first pillar
directly addresses the dispute as to whether defense mechanisms exist by stating that they
operate outside the conscious awareness of an individual, and yet they have behavioral
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consequences. They are unconscious processes functioning outside conscious awareness
used to protect one’s self.
Defense mechanisms are of varying complexity. From least to most complex is
denial, projection, and identification. Regarding projection, the most relevant mechanism
to understanding the extreme behavior addressed by this thesis, Cramer claims that “it
functions by removing disturbing thoughts or feelings from the person and placing, or
attributing them to someone else” (Cramer 2009, 3). For this to occur, one must abide by a
set of codes in order to have the disturbing thought or feelings that disrupts this code.
Although some theorists define projection more broadly to encompass
straightforward cognitive bias (Baumeister, Dale, and Sommer, 1995), it becomes
defensive when an individual perceives others to embody the threatening trait to refrain
from acknowledging that trait in oneself.
ISIS fighters may be a prime example of the operation of the projection defense.
The negative trait that ISIS fighters are at least partially repressing may be their impiety.
Thus, this impiety is what is being projected onto others to avoid acknowledging it in
themselves.
A study done by Newman, Duff, and Baumeister (1997) helps support this theory.
In their experiment, the researchers gave false positive and negative feedback about
personal traits to a pool of subjects. They were then asked to attempt to suppress the
negative feedback. Then, the subjects were shown a stimulus person who obtained some
of these attributed positive and negative traits. Next, they were asked to rate the stimulus
person based on the dimensions on which the subjects received feedback. They reported a
heightened response of the negative traits portrayed in the stimulus in which the subject
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was initially asked to suppress. Thus, the researcher concluded that “projection results from
trying to suppress thoughts about some bad trait in oneself”.
Because ISIS fighters may be suppressing the negative trait of impiety, then, in line
with Newman’s findings, perhaps the fighters are more likely to ascribe impiety to others,
such as unveiled women and homosexuals. Rather than identifying with the impious to
diminish their guilt as would be the false consensus effect, they are portraying the more
rigid definition of projection. Projection is, thus, used as a defense mechanism rather than
a conscious bias, insofar as it prevents the fighters from recognizing their own impiety.
Cramer also claims that within the individual there is a chronology of defense
mechanism development; as individuals mature, so does the complexity of their defense
mechanisms. Denial appears to be most prevalent in children up to the age of five, but once
a child reaches the ages eight to eleven, projection begins to take over. Cramer cites
research to show that at the age of five, there is little “understanding” of denial as a defense
mechanism; however, at the age of eight, there appears to be more of an understanding.
Once the defense mechanism becomes understood and operating inside awareness, it is less
effective and not primarily utilized (Cramer 2009, 3). Once one reaches adolescence,
identification is most prevalent. According to Cramer, identification “involves a change in
the self, so as to become more like some admired person or group” (2009, 3). Instead of
altering “reality”, the mechanism is internal; it is a change in personal beliefs or attributes
ascribed to oneself, rather than changing the reality of others through perception or
stereotypes.
Average ISIS fighters are in their mid-twenties. By that time, it would be expected
for identification to be the most effective defense mechanism, however it appears that
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projection may still be the most common defense mechanism among this group. Perhaps
this is due to a pausing in maturation, reinforced by the fighters’ subculture. In other words,
they are “stuck” at the defense mechanism maturity level below what would be expected
at their age, because the society in which they are engaged in promotes the use of projection
rather than identification. Projection is the reinforced mechanism as it fuels the
movement’s ideology, thus blocking more mature defense mechanisms.
Though this model appears well-fitting to the case of ISIS, it is also important to
acknowledge the existence of other factors. Cramer conducts her research among average,
middle-class individuals. These individuals are not surrounded by the same extreme
environment of ISIS fighters. Thus, factors like the entrenched subculture, physical
punitive punishment, and intense religious ideals may also play a large role in the
conduction of defense mechanisms in ISIS that Cramer does not incorporate.
With the above critique in mind, Cramer supports the possible explanation for such
heinous actions by stating that “immature defenses are related to maladaptive functioning”
(Cramer 2009, 6). Since the employed defense mechanism of ISIS fighters appear to be
immature, then according to Cramer, it is not surprising that they are operating abnormally
in the wider global society. The actions of ISIS fighters are heinous human rights violations
and morally wrong. Further, their subculture may continue to perpetuate the stagnation of
current and new fighters’ defense mechanism development.
Cramer also finds that defense mechanisms are more frequently used in stressful
environments, which is consistent with their defining function to decrease feelings of
anxiety and threats to esteem. Functioning within ISIS society is inarguably a stressful
environment, with constant pressure to adhere to strict codes of living. Cramer states that
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“increased stress leads to increased defense use, which in turn lessens the conscious
experience of anxiety or psychological upset” (2009, 9). Thus, the combination of
increased defense use due to the stressful environment with the use of an immature
mechanisms, it is not surprising that there may be some psychological disorder within ISIS
fighters.
Cramer claims that paranoia has shown to be associated with an extensive and ageinappropriate use of projection. Perhaps, the fighters are paranoid of the evolving western,
globalized, “dangerous, and infidel infested”, world. Thus, due to the incongruence
between their age and defense mechanism maturity, are maladaptive to this evolving
society. They may also be exhibiting a pathological disorder not yet diagnosable or a
combination of disorders. Additionally, “individuals with different diagnoses may use
several different defenses – i.e., no single defense is uniquely linked with a specific
diagnosis” (Cramer 2009, 11). Hence, ISIS fighters may be exhibiting a combination of
defense mechanisms and other disorders, however, a diagnosis entails more extensive
resources and research.
Sometimes bizarre psychological mechanisms are convenient given an
environment, which would help contextualize the overuse of projection in ISIS society, as
well. The thoughts of an individual fighter may begin by not wanting to think impiously,
progress to suppressing such thoughts of impiety, and so engages in actions to prove piety,
also labelled as a reaction formation that will be further discussed. As a result, these actions
may be disturbing behavioral consequences of immature and abnormal psychological
mechanisms reinforced by a myriad of factors.
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Reaction Formation
There are several types of defense mechanisms: reaction formation, projection,
displacement, undoing, isolation, sublimation, and denial. However, reaction formation is
one of the most supported mechanisms to have been tested and proven to
occur. According to Baumeister, Dale, and Sommer, “the concept of reaction formation
involves converting a socially unacceptable impulse into its opposite” (1998, 1085),
which may be “exaggerated or extreme” (1998, 1089). Reaction formation is a type of
defense mechanism that occurs when an individual feels his or her self-esteem is
threatened. In fact, “Most researchers in personality and social psychology today would
readily acknowledge that people defend their self-concepts against esteem threats”
(Baumeister, Dale, and Sommer 1998, 1083).
One component of being an ingroup member is that an individual wishes to
protect their self-esteem and maintain or create a positive social identity (Al Ramiah,
Hewstone, and Schmid, 2011). There are two ways to do this. One is to feel positive
about one’s own group by attributing negative characteristics. Fighters stereotype
outsiders as wrongdoers who are living a sinful life. This allows the fighters, and anyone
identified as an ingroup member, to feel superior and just in their actions.
Second, a group may engage in acts that make them feel good about themselves in
terms of what they can do for society to heighten both their self-esteem and the esteem
outsiders hold towards the ingroup. This can appear in many different forms. For
example, the Navajo code talkers of World War II were probably proud of their
contribution to the war effort. This is so because their code based on the native Navajo
language was pivotal in defeating the Axis powers. Hence, this positive contribution to
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society made ingroup Navajo members feel good about their group. Likewise, the esteem
held towards Navajos by Americans and Ally powers was also heightened, since they
were critical to winning the war. Similar examples include the Japanese Nisei fighters of
World War II, and martyrdom in general.
This may not be applicable to ISIS, since they do not appear to be concerned with
being well liked by outgroups. However, it may be relevant in regard to Arab culture.
Sometimes, ingroups compare themselves based on relevant traits like intelligence and
status, but some, especially lower-status ingroup members, may compare themselves on
traits, like warmth and hospitality (Al Ramiah, Hewstone, and Schmid, 2011). Arab
culture tends to pride itself on being hospitable to travelers, strangers, and anyone in
need. This hospitality may feed into a positive self-esteem with the identification as an
Arab. Hence, radical Arab ISIS fighters may feel as though they are providing haven for
recruits, or those deemed lost, which would give them assurance in adhering to the
positive trait of Arab hospitality. Thus, Arabs may feel group superiority by being good
to other groups.
As Cramer made clear, by definition, defense mechanisms are not consciously
employed; they are a way for individuals to protect themselves against an inner threat to
their self-esteem. Thus, defense mechanisms may be employed when repression is not
effective, which implies that repression is not a defense mechanism. Rather, Baumeister,
Dale, and Sommer claim that defense mechanisms occur as a result of insufficient
repression. However, it is impossible to know or test to what extent an individual represses
since it is by definition not able to be reported. Hence, it may not be that repression is not
in effect, but some combination of repression and defense mechanisms is occurring.
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Reaction formation is a defense mechanism against dangerous urges that may
threaten one’s self-esteem; instead of satisfying the impulse, one might engage in the exact
opposite, or develop a rigid belief in opposition to protect oneself. This exists in societies
where individuals may feel guilty for acting upon their urges. For example, individuals
who have impious urges, but are expected in their community to be pious, may become
extremely pious to protect against the impious desires. However, this mechanism is also
fragile, since the unconscious is attempting to suppress and compensate for desires believed
to be unacceptable. Hence, this supports the argument that repression may not be
completely absent, but rather insufficient in easing the mind of the individual.

Moral Indignation
To discuss moral indignation, P.F. Strawson first addresses the foundations and
elements of resentment. Circumstances that may produce resentment are “situations in
which one person is offended or injured by the action of another and in which – in the
absence of special considerations – offended person might naturally or normally be
expected to feel resentment” (Strawson 1974, 7). For example, if one’s foot is stepped upon
while walking down the street, the victim's level of resentment will depend on whether
special conditions (later outlined) appear to have been a factor. If no special conditions are
present, then the victim may believe the perpetrator purposefully crushed his or her foot
out of malice and the victim will resent the perpetrator.
The presence of certain special conditions may diminish the level of resentment
held. Strawson claims that reactive attitudes are adjusted when an individual sees that there
is incongruity between offenders’ morals, or perceived morals, and their actions. In this
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case, feelings of resentment may be diminished (Strawson 1974, 8). These special
conditions are outlined to include,
…conditions like compulsion by another, or innate incapacity, or insanity, or other
less extreme forms of psychological disorder, or the existence of circumstances in
which the making of any other choice would be morally inadmissible or would be
too much to expect of any man (Strawson 1974, 2-3).
Thus, for any perpetrator who is seen as “abnormal” or not acting in one’s “right mind”,
the amount of resentment is reduced or nulled.
This also applies to moral indignation. If offenders are categorized as “abnormal”,
then they are not held to the same moral codes of a society; the individual is not a “morally
responsible agent”, and, thus, is not a “member of the moral community” (Strawson 1974,
17). Thus, one cannot apply normal standards of obligation and responsibility when special
conditions are present; "freedom" and "normalcy" is when these conditions are not present.
An individual’s reaction to an offender is not only based on the offender’s
characteristics, but also the victim's reactive attitudes. According to Strawson, “participant
reactive attitudes are essentially normal human reactions to the good or ill will of
indifferent others towards us” (Strawson 1974, 10). The expectations of goodwill is
determined by the social structure by which individuals adhere (Strawson 1974, 14).
Resentment is a personal reactive attitude; moral indignation is a moral reactive
attitude. Both are merely reactions to felt damaging behavior, however, Strawson identifies
the difference in this way:
The reactive attitudes I have now to discuss [those of moral indignation] might be
described as the sympathetic or vicarious or impersonal or disinterested or
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generalized analogues of the reactive attitudes I have already discussed. They are
reactions to the qualities of others’ wills, not towards ourselves, but towards others.
Because of this impersonal or vicarious character, we give them different names.
Thus, one who experiences the vicarious analogue of resentment is said to be
indignant or disapproving, or morally indignant or disapproving” (Strawson 1974,
14).
Thus, moral indignation appears to just be a personal step removed from resentment.
There may be a connection to the theory of vicarious retribution, since Strawson
speaks to the point that resentment is a personal reaction while moral indignation is an
extension, possibly less personal reaction. To this, he states, “we can have direct dealings
with human beings without any degree of personal involvement, treating them simply as
creatures to be handled in our own interests, or our side’s, or society’s – or even theirs”
(Strawson 1974, 12). Like vicarious retribution, an individual may feel morally indignant
towards an entire group of people or society for the actions of single perpetrator.
To apply the frameworks of resentment and moral indignation to terrorism, one
must deem the perpetrator as having ‘normal’ interpersonal-relations and being “free” from
special conditions. If one saw a terrorist as suffering from any special conditions, then there
would be a rationalization for the violent acts. Some may very well say that perpetrators,
such as the head choppers of ISIS, are mentally ill or not “normal” in one way or another;
however, this is merely another factor to consider. Some may consider terrorists to suffer
from special conditions, but there may be different explanations through various
psychological frameworks.
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Further, hypothetical examples that demonstrate a connection between reaction
formations and moral indignation, hypothetical examples follows:
If an individual is born into an extremely pious Sunni Muslim society, then he or
she would probably be raised strictly within Islamic codes. This would entail earnestly
believing in the words of the Qur’an and hadith. Deviation from anything other than
complete devotion may result in dishonor and extreme physical punishment or
exile. Regarding the discussion of reaction formation and ISIS, if an individual is raised in
such an orthodox society and unconsciously doubts the pillars of Islam, then he or she may
become overly devout, to the point of extremity. This is to compensate for thoughts
doubting the scriptures, rituals, and beliefs of Islam; thereby eliminating the guilt. This
may be a source of extreme reactions to perceived impiety enacted by ISIS. He or she may
fully embrace the rhetoric of a pan-Sunni caliphate to compensate for unconscious doubts
in the religion and the movement’s objectives.
ISIS fighters may well be exhibiting reaction formations in their behavior towards
perceived to be impious or immoral others. This view leads to punitive action taken against
those impiously perceived, which may be fueled by moral indignation and the fragility in
which reaction formation occurs. The connection to moral indignation is crucial; if one is
being openly devout then he or she may feel indignant to those who are not, or perceived
to be not. The esteem of the pious person (acting pious as a result of reaction formation)
may feel threatened or injured by the impious group due to their impiety, thus resulting in
feelings of moral indignation. Supporting the reason behind such extremity, Baumeister,
Dale, and Sommer write, “In particular, when people are publicly or implicitly accused of
having socially undesirable sexual feelings, prejudiced attitudes, or failures of competence,
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some respond by asserting the opposite (and attempting to prove it) to an exceptionally
high degree [parentheses in original, italics inserted]” (1998, 1089). The extremity of such
ISIS fighters may be a result of the developed moral indignation fueled by a reaction
formation; as well as the fragility of the reaction formation, since it could be compensating
for what is not sufficiently repressed.
A devout, Sunni Muslim man may develop an intense reaction formation to the
sight of an unveiled woman. In this instance, two separate reaction formations may
develop: one as a result of her sexual enticement and another due to her perceived impiety.
Thus, extreme punitive action may occur. Like in the example described above, fighters
unconsciously doubting their piety may, in turn, act extremely pious; the sight of an
unveiled woman, which displays such impiety, may be perceived as a threat to their own
piety. Hence, punitive action may occur towards the unveiled women to satisfy the
unconscious, impious guilt and conscious threat to piety as well as feelings of moral
indignation of the fighter.
In the other possible reaction formation developing in this scenario, an ISIS fighter
may be defending against his heightened sexual urge aroused by the woman. His reaction
may be to reject these “inappropriate” sexual desires as well as denounce impious sexual
interactions, since such actions are sinful and outlawed in strict Sunni communities. This,
too, may result in aggressiveness towards the woman, since she is now blameworthy in his
conscious for being enticing.
In accordance with this theory, the contemporary extremely harsh treatment of
women in some Muslim societies or movements, such as ISIS, may not truly be a result of
animus toward women. Instead it may be the result of a defense mechanism for men to hide
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their subconscious urges to act impiously, to engage in inappropriate sexual actions, or a
conscious feeling of moral indignation against those perceived to be impious, most likely
of which is a combination. Though not consciously aware of the reason for his actions, he
must show animus towards the women perceived as harlots because they would engage his
unacceptable desires.
Another example of reaction formation as a result of perceived to be inappropriate
sexual desires is homophobia. A study done by Adams, Wright, and Lohr in 1996 proved
the existence of reaction formation in relation to homophobia. The experimenters placed
homophobic males in front of videos showing homosexual intercourse. Though the subject
reported no sexual arousal, the physiological results showed the opposite. This shows that
the male denouncing homosexuality may actually be more prone to homosexual
arousal. The unconscious sexual arousal results in a conscious rejection of homosexuality.
(Adams, Wright, and Lohr, 1996).
Homosexuality of any sort is deemed shameful and immoral in Muslim
communities, and even more so in extreme organizations like ISIS. In its terror and extreme
interpretations of the Qur’an, ISIS has been known to persecute and execute many gay
men. As punishment, the accused homosexual male is pushed off a tall building. If the fall
is not enough to kill him, a group on the ground is present to ensure his death by stoning.
Reportedly, ISIS killed 36 gay men in the month of December 2015 alone and continues
its persecution today of young homosexual males aged as young as fifteen.
(counterextremism.com, 2018).
Extrapolating from the study of Adams, Wright, and Lohr, perhaps some male
fighters are unconsciously having homosexual tendencies that are resulting in extreme
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animosity towards homosexuals. This circumstance is similar to those experiencing
unacceptable urges towards unapproachable women; aggression and blame is thus being
projected onto women and homosexuals as a result of unconscious guilt of inappropriate
sexual, homosexual, or overall impious urges – fueled by perceived impiety which creates
moral indignation.

Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development
Kohlberg developed a six-stage theory of moral development. It claims that as
humans develop, so does their morality. However applicable Kohlberg’s work may be, it
is also important to bear in mind that his scale only leads up to his conception of
morality. Nevertheless, his stages are applicable to help explain a justification for the
adherence ISIS fighters have to their society, as do others to their respective societies.
The stages are as follows:
Stage 1: The punishment and obedience orientation.
Stage 2: The instrumental relativist orientation.
Stage 3: The interpersonal concordance or “good boy-nice girl” orientation.
Stage 4: The “law and order” orientation.
Stage 5: The social-contract legalistic orientation (usually with utilitarian
overtones).
Stage 6: The universal ethical-principle orientation. (Kohlberg, 1971)
According to Kohlberg, most humans reach Stage 4 of his moral scale, with only some
reaching Stages 5 and 6. ISIS fighters, too, develop to Stage 4, which may seem
incongruous at first, but helps to explain why the group has grown so strong and
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continues to expand. It may appear as though these fighters are unable to develop past the
second stage, which is self-interest, given that the maturation of defense mechanisms may
halt around that time. However, outside observers may have this perception because they
do not want to consider the possibility that beheading or raping another human being is at
the same level of maturity as their own.
Prior to joining the organization, ISIS fighters may have found recruitment most
attractive at Stage 3 of their moral development. This occurs in school-age years when
the individual is seeking approval and affection. For example, if a school-age or teenage
boy sees his older brother engaging in ISIS activity, then he may seek approval by
conforming to his older brother’s behavior. Being obedient and engaging in the same
society satisfies the teenager’s desire for approval and positive relations. Once this is
fulfilled, his conformity within the organization is rigidified by the ISIS social order, and
reaches Stage 4 of Kohlberg’s model. This stage is characterized by authority and social
order, with a fixation on maintaining the adopted social order. He now feels integrated,
accepted, and productive within ISIS society. Further, his behaviors continue to be
reinforced through the structured belief system.
What appears incongruent to outside observers is that they, too, see themselves as
above Stage 3, but find it hard to grasp that their own level of morality matches those of
ISIS fighters. The difference, however, is these outside observers abide by a completely
different social order. Both social orders offer similar satisfactions to an individual
seeking acceptance within a society. The “law and order” of ISIS is the caliphate, while
many other societies accept democracy and different ideals of morality as the order by
which to abide.
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The rigidity and strictly adhered social structure is one element that makes ISIS so
successful. They are attractive for the same reasons that other social orders are attractive;
they provide an opportunity to feel as though one plays a vital role in a society and an
identity to some that feel lost. Having a larger goal to strive towards also strengthens the
society. Thus, it is not possible to dismiss ISIS as an anomaly, for it functions in similar
ways as many other successful social orders. Their beliefs in what laws should be and
how society ought to operate is the differentiating factor.

Conclusion of Theories
Given the review of the psychological theories and some potential applications to
the psyche of extremists, it is important to explore the relationships among these theories
and connect them back to the divisions of personality. If connections can be made
through these theories of how and why one may inflict violence, then potential
explanations may be considered to decipher the psychological complexity of an
extremist. Most of the theories may be traced back and incorporated with Lasswell’s
theory regarding the id, ego, and superego. By taking these subconscious entities into
account with other theories on violence, there may be more nuanced psychological
explanations of extremist action.
How do individuals progress to a point where they can indulge their id while
satisfying their superego? To do this, the id must be suppressed or indulged, or indulged
while being consciously suppressed. The individuals chopping off heads must be
consistent with their conscience in order to avoid feelings of guilt. Further, there are too
many instances of like heinous actions for psychopathology to be the reason. Cramer says
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the use of projection as a defense mechanism may be this stronghold, while Strawson
suggests moral indignation accounts for these actions.
Strawson provides that one becomes indignant when a norm is violated according
to the individual’s social and moral order. The breaking of this social rule justifies one to
lash out, which indulges the id. He or she is often further encouraged by those in society
since they, too, feel indignant towards the rule that has been broken. Both the id and
superego are being satisfied in this instance. The superego is supported through the
rigidity of society that supports retaliation for the violated norm, and the id is allowed to
act upon the urge because it does not violate the superego. The impiety of an other is a
violation to an ISIS fighter’s personal morality, and this indignation allows the conscious
to act abrasively.
In contrast, Cramer suggests that these individuals do not feel guilty for
perpetrating such atrocities because of the overuse and reinforcement of projection as the
primary defense mechanism. Through projection, the id is suppressed enough to satisfy
the superego. However, since defense mechanisms are unconscious, the satisfaction of
the id is unconscious. Thus, the id is indulged while simultaneously being suppressed
from consciousness.
It appears that there may be a connection between Freudian’s theory, Lasswell’s
displacement hypothesis, Strawson’s moral indignation, and Cramer’s defense
mechanisms insofar as these theories hold. Since displacement and defense mechanisms
take place outside of conscious awareness, the discomfort that is displaced onto a remote
object may be a result of a defense mechanism, such as projection. The defense
mechanism is suppressing the discomfort and then it is displaced. Thus, defense
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mechanisms may account for what is occurring unconsciously to allow for displacement
to then occur; displacement, then, may be the unconscious result of defense mechanisms.
Displacement of the particular attribution onto a group then leads to stereotyping
and Strawson’s moral indignation. The individual has become morally indignant towards
the offenders, and since the indignation is not taken out on the direct object, stereotypes
develop. For example, consider that a Muslim teenage boy sees his mother engaging in
impious activity. The impiety of his mother causes discomfort, but it is repressed through
defense mechanisms. However, the discomfort actualizes in displacing it onto all other
Muslim women. Thus, he has become morally indignant towards the group that identifies
as Muslim women and has stereotyped anyone fitting that identity as impious. Hence, the
result is that the boy satisfies the defensively repressed id urges by acting out towards a
group he has stereotyped as impious.
In another possible scenario that may pertain to ISIS fighters, the actions of
displacement could be a result of repressing an individual’s negative self-assessment
about an attribute. Here, the defense mechanisms work to repress the acceptance of the
individual’s negative trait and then it is displaced onto another object. Similar to the
previous example, if an individual is having impious thoughts, feelings, or urges, then
defense mechanisms may unconsciously suppress them. Then, displacement occurs in
ascribing the attribute of impiety to others, when it is the individual refusing to recognize
it in him or herself. Hence, this leads to the same pattern of moral indignation and
stereotyping.
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Analysis and Recommendations
Insofar as Lasswell’s psychological model relies on the existence of the id, ego,
and superego, Tajfel’s social identity theory, Strawson’s explanation of moral indignation
against impiety, and Cramer’s ideas about defense-mechanism maturity and their
allowance for unconscious indulgence hold, what can be done to derail the rigid social
order of ISIS or prevent its expansion?
In accounts of individuals who once engaged in the actions of ISIS, there appears
to be a moment of realization. Manwar Ali was a dedicated member of ISIS who
recruited young men, fundraised in the name of violent jihad, and preached his
commitment to establishing an Islamic Caliphate for over fifteen years. He claims that
joining the group at such a young age prevented him from developing a virtuous
character, which may relate to the maturity of defense mechanisms and becoming “stuck”
in this rigidified culture. After more than a decade of promoting ISIS, while his family
lived safely in the United Kingdom, Ali began to question his actions and the justification
of a violent jihad. It is important to note that this may have been a true change in heart by
Ali and not influenced by pressures of detainment. Threats within detainment can
sometimes coerce individuals into professing a change in heart. Rather, he said that he
became aware of the unjust violence and misinterpretation of Islam through selfcontemplation and asking himself the hard questions about what the Qur’an says. He
recognizes that those drawn to ISIS are not much different from everyone else but
become “blinded by the cause”. In order to de-radicalize these young men, Ali says they
must be filled with human healing values that increase understanding and awareness of
others.
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Though the majority of ISIS may not have the time or maturity to come to this
self-realization, many fighters who were captured while carrying out an attack, or
succeeded in doing so and then were arrested, attest to feelings of remorse. There are
videos of young, attempted suicide bombers apologizing, and one that shows an exHamas radical who now preaches peace (AussieDaveinIsrael, YouTube). The
psychological theories may account for these examples that show their id satisfaction by
the fulfillment of their superego fueled by ISIS doctrine, but once removed from ISIS,
their superego “rebalanced” and they felt remorse for acting upon, or attempting to act
upon, their urges.
There ought to be a methods to persuade disassociation from radical groups.
Rather than military force, since this may enhance their feelings of moral indignation and
heighten defense mechanisms, one ought to focus on attacking them psychologically and
utilizing other methods of intervention. Ex-radicals spreading their new orientation
toward Islam and meaning of jihad that does not advocate such violence may be one of
the most promising keys to derailing these radical groups, since they are closest to being
an ingroup member.
Current theories support the importance ex-radicals may play in intergroup
conflict alleviation. Miles Hewstone addresses some of these theories that stem from
Tajfel’s social identity theory. Since ex-radicals are the closest to being an ingroup
member, they understand the identity of a “promoter of violent jihad”. Thus, these exradicals can relate to this identity, and also to other identities of current fighters like
devout Muslim, Arab, male, and potentially similar feelings of moral indignation. Hence,
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the ex-radicals ought to appeal to the alternative identities of an ISIS fighter to persuade
their withdrawal, which will be further supported by Hewstone.

Contact Hypothesis
Hewstone (1996) reviews different methods of intervention to weaken conflict
between opposing groups. Each of the intervention proposals are based on the assumption
that Tajfel’s social identity theory holds. Social psychologist have long theorized about
the contact hypothesis. Hewstone defines it as “contact between members of different
groups will improve relations between them” (Hewstone 1996, 327). Contact, however,
can be further broken down to interpersonal and intergroup contact. First, interpersonal
contact focuses on taking individuals from opposing groups and placing them in an
environment conducive to constructive contact.
There are multiple factors to create such an environment such as “under equal
conditions of equal status, stereotype disconfirmation, and cooperation” (Cook 1962, 6684). Without these elements, contact may exacerbate the negative perceptions instead of
weakening them. In this type of intervention, it may be vital to focus on information that
pertains to the individuals rather than the group. Thus, the approach may be to focus on
shared identity rather than the one that is contradicting and salient. This is the process of
“personalization” and crosscutting categories. In a given scenario, one identity is
heightened over the other and contact is aimed at balancing or switching the heighted
identity to a shared one; it attempts to weaken the salient identity causing conflict and
strengthen one that supports cooperation. In theory and in laboratory experiments, this
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has lessened discrimination and prejudice (see Bettencourt, Brewer, Rogers-Croak, and
Miller, 1992; Miller, Brewer, and Edwards, 1985).
A tactic could be that when first introducing two seventeen-year-old boys, one a
devout Muslim who despises the West and one who perceives all Muslims to be
terrorists, initiate conversation about a shared identity, like a love of watching soccer,
rather than their stereotypical identities. A strategy may be to reveal the superior
identities (Muslim and Westerner) to the individuals after they have cooperated and
established a similarity. This reinforces a common identity and cooperation.
However, there are drawbacks to using personalization and crosscutting as
intervention methods. First, contact must be in a specific environment and the ability to
control so many factors is difficult. If the factors are not conducive to constructive
contact, then there is a possibility of the contact strengthening the biases, which would be
the opposite of the objective. Second, interpersonal contact is on a microlevel. It may
create a diffusion of tension between two individuals, but it does not necessarily help
weaken animosity between entire groups.
The other branch of the contact hypothesis is intergroup contact. This proposes
that the individuals in contact must be seen as representatives of the outgroup, rather than
hiding the salient identity during interpersonal contact. This may account for the
interpersonal drawback that it only effects the two individuals since these two represent
each outgroup. According to Hewstone, it does not have to be numerous members in
contact, just ones that are perceived to be representative of each group and, thus, are
influential to the rest of the ingroup. This is an instance when the power of ex-radicals
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being as close to an ingroup member as possible could be beneficial because they may
serve as this ingroup representative.
One of the most promising identities may be that of a devout Muslim. Many
Muslims around the world, including the ex-radicals, claim that the violent jihad is not
supported in the words for the Qur’an and thus, those engaging in such acts are not true
Muslims. If one can appeal to a fighters devotion by saying they are not devout, then it
may cause reconsideration and self-recategorization. Rather, possibly strengthening their
non-violent identities like Arab, African, male, father, brother, educated, or other
identities may prove beneficial.
However, one would have to be cautious when creating this type of environment
as well. In a study reviewed by Hewstone that aimed at changing perceptions between
Hindus and Muslims, the intergroup contact only heighted anxiety, which negated
positive attitude change. To avoid such anxiety, the contact environment ought to be a
neutral position that makes each party comfortable and is not threatening.
There appears to be a need for incorporating contact hypothesis with a
crosscutting of categorizations. Hewstone supports by stating,
Yet, if crossed categorization can force [italics in original] continual realignments
among individuals and categories via extended interactions on the basis of
multiple categorizations at different points in time (Miller & Brewer, 1986), then
it should be a significant component of many interventions to reduce intergroup
discrimination (Hewstone 1996, 348).
Hence, if an environment can be created where representatives of two outgroups feel
equal and not anxious, then there is room for positive change in attitudes.
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Thus, Hewstone finds that interpersonal contact achieved decategorization and
intergroup contact achieves change in attitudes. Interpersonal contact, then, may be
beneficial when working to de-radicalize a former individual ISIS member. Further,
intergroup contact seems to be necessary if one aims to change the perceptions between
the entire group of ISIS and the perceived outgroup. This could be done by constructive
contact between non-ISIS Muslim leaders, like ex-radicals, and representatives of the
outgroup.
Further, Hewstone (1996) addresses a method of intervention when discussing
common ingroup identity. He suggests that decategorization, that may occur during the
process of contact intervention, may move ingroup members towards the outgroup. This
may cause the ingroup member to be seen less positively by the ingroup, which an
individual does not prefer assuming that the individual wants to remain being seen
positively. In contrast, recategorization increases the attractiveness of the outgroup while
maintaining ingroup status. Thus, the tactic could be to attempt to recategorize the group
as non-violent to the ingroup members. However, Hewstone (1996) also addresses that
this method of intervention seems effective in theory, but remains difficult to implement
because religious and ethnic identities tend to be so salient.
Another element of the contact hypothesis regards identity complexity. When
individuals encompass multiple salient categories, and thus have a more complex
identity, it has been shown in some contexts (Brewer, 2005) that they are less likely to
engage in intergroup discrimination or stereotyping. Hence, the hypothesis is that the
more complex an identity, the more tolerance it has towards outgroups (Al Ramiah,
Hewstone, and Schmid, 2011). One tactic may be to “complicate” the identities of ISIS
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fighters by exposing them to outgroups through contact. Insofar as Brewer’s findings
hold, then the more complex an intervention method can make an individual’s identity,
then the more tolerant he or she will become toward outgroups. This, in turn, may lessen
intergroup conflict and perceptions of stereotypes.

Prevention Method
It would be ideal to prevent individuals from joining ISIS, Boko Haram, or
similar movements in the first place. One of the first steps to do this may be to identify
high-risk areas of recruitment. The characteristics of these regions, like Nigeria, may
show to have a combination of political, social, and economic unrest with a relatively
young population. The turbulence created by such instability fosters psychological
problems for a developing population searching for identity and purpose. In these places,
not only are their basic human needs not being met, but also their psychological needs to
conform or identify are not satisfied. If regions with a high likelihood of fostering
radicalism and recruitment can be pre-emptively identified, then aid programs, or
methods of preemptive crosscutting, may be implemented to satisfy psychological needs,
which could decrease their chances of being attracted to radical groups such as Boko
Haram or ISIS.
Tanzania serves as an important example as to how the fostering of stereotypes
can be minimized and the societal stability that a lack of stereotyping promotes. President
Nyerere, who led the nation twenty-four years before retiring in 1985, saw national unity
as the most pressing issue facing the nation. To combat ethnic cleavages, Nyerere
implemented multiple policies to increase cooperation and exposure among ethnic

Flynn 50

groups. Swahili was made the official language and the teaching of ethnic tongues was
prohibited in schools. He also disallowed civil servants from working in their
hometowns, which forced many to integrate into unfamiliar villages and with different
people (“Tanzania avoid tribal tensions rife elsewhere in Africa”, The Washington Post).
This created a national identity alongside ethnic ones, and allowed for understanding
between ethnic identities under the shared national identity.
This advanced integration of tribes and ethnicities has proven successful and may
be implemented elsewhere, though exposure may need to occur at a young age before
each group’s identity, defense mechanism maturation, and moral development have been
rigidified. Integrating children in schools may prevent stereotypes from initially
developing and then continued integration in the workforce possibly maintains the
stability and psychological development. Early exposure could be key because these are
the most formative years of an individual’s psychological development. Hence, it may be
critical to reach a population when they are in Stage 3 of Kohlberg’s moral development
and developing out of the use of projection as a primary defense mechanism. Defense
mechanisms, then for example, would be able to mature properly. Rather than halting at
projection, they might be able to mature to identification with the understanding of one
another. Thus, individuals may be able to recognize their own identities and accept the
identities of others.
Likewise, individuals may still progress to Stage 4 of Kohlberg’s model, but the
social structure to which they adhere would not be one that makes another inferior, but
rather one that sees the importance of plurality within a single social order. This tactic
could possibly lessen the likelihood of rigid feelings of moral indignation or reaction
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formations developing, since one group is not feeling offended by another. Individuals
also may not feel relatively deprived based on their ethnic, tribal, or religious identity
because the mixing of status lessens stereotypes.
Further, entitativity breaks down when an individual sees that everyone within a
perceived stereotype does not completely represent the assumed traits. Deprivation may
stem from other sources, like economic status, but it could be unlikely for an entire group
to blame another for their deprivation since one is not better off than another, or even
perceived to be. This is an example of “pre-emptive” crosscutting that Hewstone supports
by claiming that social scientists and politicians ought to include such conflict prevention
strategies in constitutions and policies (Hewstone, 1996).

Foreign Recruits
The most susceptible targets of de-recruitment may be foreign recruits. Many who
have left their homes in Europe and the United States to join ISIS claim to not join with
the intent of fighting. Some allege that they are attracted to the opportunities presented,
but not the violence. For this reason, their superego may not be yet rigidified and more
susceptible to promising enticement outside of the group.
One possible tactic may be to “de-recruit” them from ISIS in the same ways they
were initially recruited; persuade that their current identity is misguided under the
teachings of the Qur’an.; possibly appeal to their id and longing for purpose or identity
through videos, outreach, and opportunity. This is what ISIS advertises; if anti-ISIS
leaders advertise the same opportunity, then there may be a chance at disassociation.
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Hence, the same psychological tactics that are used to entice them could be used to
induce them to withdraw.
If this were to occur, actual opportunity ought to be presented, not just the
illusion. For example, once these fighters have been disassociated, productive placements
for them may be in trade schools and other educational strategies to develop skills to
become constructive members of society, since they are seeking identity, purpose, and
community. The tactic of providing education and a community may foster a salient
identity that is consistent with a peaceful lifestyle.
Daniel E. Agbiboa (2015), applies Tajfel’s social identity theory to that Boko
Haram, and suggests that many of the recruited fighters are young people who feel lost
within society. Due to economic inequality, poverty, unemployment, and lack of basic
human needs, their psychological needs are not being met. The search for identity stems
from a lack of economic opportunity and, thus, ways to feel productive in society.
Boko Haram offers a purpose in promising prosperity in the afterlife. Hence, an
attainable purpose in this life ought to be presented, or an outlet for the id to act upon
urges against those by which the individual has been offended in a non-violent
environment; provide constructive outlets of expression that Crosby mentions may have
been blocked from extropunitives engaging in violence against society. Since it may not
be realistic to suggest merely devoting resources to economic improvement, one tactic
could be to focus aid on social and psychological development. This may be pursued by
building communities, social structures, and opportunities for productive expression of
grievances. However, this recommendation must be nuanced by the acknowledgement
that it may require immense resources.
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Conclusion
As established, the matter in question is not whether acts of terrorism are heinous,
destructive, and terrifying. Rather, the question is how the psyches of individual
perpetrators allow them to engage in such acts that oppose a globally accepted belief
system that denounces extreme violence. This thesis has explored various dynamics as to
what may be psychologically occurring that allows for this behavior.
An exploration between the interplay of psychological theories, such as the
divisions of personality, and those of social psychology, such as the social identity theory,
has shown that there may be psychological dynamics occurring to account for extremist
violence and intergroup conflict. Further, this thesis has attempted to disprove the notion
that no reasoning lies behind extremist behavior. Instead, the inner dynamics of an
individual’s psychological development, identity, and environment may shape the
reasoning behind extremist behavior and perceived stereotypes.
Insofar as Lasswell’s theory of the triple-appeal principle and Tajfel and Turner’s
social identity theory hold, the source of extreme violence may stem from the
dissatisfaction of the id and dynamics of personal identification. If the id is not satisfied,
then it may act out in various manners such as vicarious retribution and moral indignation,
or protect itself by using defense mechanisms. Likewise, if one’s identity is threatened,
similar protective actions may be pursued, which may lead to the engagement in violent
acts.
If social psychologists can explore the dynamics that may account for violent
behavior, then recommendations on how to lessen violent episodes may be formed. This
thesis has addressed a few potential methods of intervention to decrease violent tendencies
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and weaken negative perceptions, such as the contact hypothesis. Again, it would be
important to account for the underlying psychological dynamics that may be at play when
creating an environment for contact between antagonistic individuals or groups. It may
prove to be important to consider the dynamics that have been outlined when devising
future methods of prevention and dissociation.
This being said, ample room still exists for more research in order to strengthen the
arguments laid out in this thesis. This would require access to individuals who exhibit
extremist mentality. Tailored interviews may bring to light the psychological dynamics that
have been theorized. However, it must be acknowledged that this type of access may be
rare. Further, each case of extremist behavior and mindset ought to be taken on a case-bycase basis. The combination of dynamics at play may differ frequently, since the
socialization of every individual is different.
Lastly, further research ought to focus on the psychological dynamics of extremist
behavior rather than their espoused motives. As this thesis has attempted to illuminate,
subconscious motivations and factors may lead to violent outbreaks. Subconscious
elements may be the key to dismantling the rigidified belief structures of extremist
behavior, intergroup conflict, and negative perceptions.
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